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Aquaculture Development in Scotland:
Regulation as a Moving Equilibrium
DEBORAH PEEL∗ & MICHAEL GREGORY LLOYD∗∗
∗School of the Environment, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK; ∗∗School of the Built Environment,
University of Ulster, Dundee, UK
ABSTRACT The expanding interest in marine planning and management raises important questions
for the spectrum of marine, coastal and terrestrial environments. The role of state regulation in
mediating conflicts over the use and development of the marine resource has spatial implications
across these domains. Governance of the marine represents a very particular challenge since it
involves a highly complex mix of common, legal and customary property rights and sets of
defined territorial jurisdictions. The Planning etc. (Scotland) Act 2006 and subsequent policy
iterations have changed institutional and organizational relations. The legislation included
provisions for the extension of statutory land use planning controls to include coastal and
transitional waters (i.e. to the 12-nautical mile limit), meaning that finfish and shellfish farming
are subject to the terrestrial planning regime. This represents a turn from self-regulation to
arrangements for state planning controls. This paper traces this evolution in terms of a moving
equilibrium as both state and market have sought to minimize the transaction costs involved.
‘The law is always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt
it to this newly perceived aspects of the commons.’ (Hardin 1968, 1245)
Introduction
The emerging focus on the exploitation of the marine environment and an interest in devel-
oping appropriate institutional frameworks for its planning, management and regulation
require an understanding of how relations might be organized and how competing
state–market interests reconciled. Using aquaculture as a proxy for marine exploitation,
this paper explores some of the principal issues in order to highlight the complexities
involved and the sensitivities required in institutional design and implementation. Specifi-
cally, we deploy thinking drawn from a new institutionalist perspective in order to
examine the incremental transfer in property rights that has occurred in Scotland over
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five decades with respect to the management of marine fish and shellfish farming activities
which involved a turn from self- to state regulation.
The expanding interest in the planning and management of the marine resource serves to
highlight the competing nature of its users and uses, together with its associated bundle of
property rights (Howarth 2006). In this respect, the marine is as distinctive as the terrestrial
domain. A potential ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968, and see the earlier papers by
Gordon 1954; Scott 1955) is held to be a persistent feature of the marine environment
leading to its over-exploitation, the degradation of its ecosystem and, as the opening quo-
tation suggests, legal under-provision. In the context of statutory land use planning, inter-
vention is deemed necessary to manage and minimize the transaction costs involved in
land and property development to serve the public interest (see, for example, Dawkins
2000; Alexander 2001a, 2005; Webster 2005a). Devising an appropriate governance
regime is complex. Following Feeny, Hanna, and McEvoy (1996), understanding the
underlying individual motivations; the characteristics of individuals; the nature of existing
institutional arrangements; the interactions among resource users; the ability to create new
institutional arrangements and the behaviour of the regulatory authorities involved is criti-
cal to understanding the social context in which institutional regimes operate and regulat-
ory frameworks evolve.
In practice, and as a consequence of this evident and evolving complexity, the planning
and governance of the marine environment in Scotland, for example, have come to the
fore. New forms of activity for exploiting the sea-bed and marine eco-systems require
new institutional arrangements. Wave and tidal energy, mineral extraction and ecotourism
are illustrative of the new marine uses which necessitate associated infrastructure and user
requirements. Changing marine contexts may conflict with established and relatively more
traditional marine and coastal activities, and necessitate appropriate modes of mediation
and strategic planning (Peel and Lloyd 2004). The shaping of governance and regulatory
arrangements then becomes of critical importance. As noted above, there is a need to
understand and explain the social interplay of institutional arrangements and organiz-
ational behaviours involved in the efficient, effective and equitable use of the marine
resource, particularly as alternative commercial and resource-based markets and technol-
ogies emerge.
The societal dynamics involved in devising appropriate governance of the marine
environment are highly complex. The ways in which different transactions and relations
between different marine users are mediated may themselves be prone to challenge and
contestation. It is the heterogeneous nature of those interests and uses that arguably
pose the greatest challenge to devising an appropriate governance regime to manage the
marine resource as a collective good with its embedded potential for property rights mis-
matches (Yandle 2007). Technological advances, scientific discoveries and innovative
methods of exploiting the marine environment provide for a dynamic context which
raises important issues for decision-making arrangements. It is, therefore, important to
anticipate the responses to embryonic forms of institutional design in the sustainable
exploitation, planning and management of the marine resource. New ‘rules of the
game’ (North 1980) are AQ1layered upon established sets of power relations, property
rights, customs, behaviours and attitudes (Feeny, Hanna, and McEvoy 1996). It follows
that specific interest groups may wield relatively more power than others over decisions
about how to — or how not to — access, use or conserve aspects of the marine resource
(Peel and Lloyd 2009). Of particular interest here is the role of the state in mediating
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competing sets of private interests in what is deemed to be the public interest. The purpose
of this paper was to contribute to an understanding of the nature of these changing relations
and interactions; following Alexander (2001a), to infer aspects of discriminating align-
ment and institutional design necessary to obtain multi-actor buy-in and, finally, to
reflect on how different actors respond to new marine governance regimes — and work
towards a moving equilibrium.
The broad context for this paper explores the complex nature of the bundle of common
and private property rights associated with aquaculture, alongside the allied interrelations
between economic action, social and environmental costs, and the institutional designs
relating to the marine and coastal–marine interface. The discussion examines the emer-
gence of a new planning regulatory framework to manage aquaculture in Scotland,
drawing on Coase’s (1937, 1960) seminal work on the nature of transaction costs and
market efficiency. Our reasoning is informed by the cross-disciplinary new institutionalist
perspective on understanding the changing nature of social and economic relationships
and institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996; Nee 2001). For example, Merton (2001, ii)
argues that:
the contemporary paradigm of institutional analysis involves an ‘intellectual trade’
that transcends the traditional boundaries of the social sciences. The benefits of such
trade can be seen in the exchange and application of such domain-bridging concepts
as choice within institutional and organizational contexts, bounded rationality,
social embeddedness and social networks, transaction costs, human and social
capital, externalities and enforcing trust.
New institutionalism’s translation into a number of individual disciplines — e.g. soci-
ology, economics and law (Hall and Taylor 1996) — and the expanding breadth of interest
in the topic, alerts us to its potential relevance in studying planning and governance in the
specific and inter-disciplinary context of the marine. The following section provides an
overview of these theoretical perspectives before examining their potential for understand-
ing a transaction costs analysis to planning and regulating aquaculture. The dynamics of
devising an appropriate governance regime are then illustrated with respect to the
ongoing recalibration of state regulation of aquaculture in Scotland. The final section dis-
cusses the theoretical and applied implications of a moving equilibrium.
New Institutionalism
New institutionalism has offered fresh insights into understanding the complex inter-
relations involved in the reconciliation of private property rights and the public interest.
New institutionalism explores the complex relations involved in economic, societal and
environmental decision-making (Williamson 2000). It is explicitly interdisciplinary in
nature which has led to considerable exchange, debate and cross-fertilization of its con-
stituent disciplinary ideas. In the context of statutory land use planning and governance
discourses, for example, both the institutionalist perspective (Healey 1997, 1999; Vigar
et al. 2000; Alexander 2005) and the transaction costs analytical approach (Alexander
1992; Dawkins 2000; Sager 2006) are important strands of thought. In particular, Alexan-
der’s (2001) exploration AQ2of transaction cost theory in relation to public land use planning is
helpful in providing a systematic approach to differentiating alternative feasible forms of
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governance arrangements. Moreover, Alexander (2001 AQ2) makes a critical distinction
between the transaction costs incurred by those directly involved in an exchange, for
example, a developer and a local planning authority, and indirect parties, such as the
wider public or future generations, who may benefit from enhanced governance and regu-
lation. This reasoning helps inform our understanding of the processes involved in secur-
ing a wider public interest.
Whilst we should not underestimate the intellectual tensions in new institutionalism, we
can highlight two important dimensions of the institutional turn in rethinking state–market
relations. Firstly, theories of governance concerned with ‘the coordination and fusion of
public and private resources’ have become more commonplace in the context of
Western European local government (Pierre 1999, 373). Secondly, this fusion has empha-
sized an active appreciation of the value dimensions which structure, guide and give
meaning to the arrangements and processes of governance (Pierre 1999). In particular,
this realignment of a state–market dichotomy reflects the development of ideas promoting
a shift from government to governance, the latter being based on the broad partnership
model of public and private interests (Buitelaar 2003). A perceived need for a dynamic,
fluid and non-linear understanding of developing complex regulation has prompted a
search for new forms of governance, including statutory land use planning (Buitelaar
and Needham 2007). New institutionalism offers the potential of providing fresh insights
into understanding processes of institutional design, organizational relations and social
exchange and how these are negotiated and reconciled to secure (more) efficient outcomes
by, and for, the parties involved.
There are critiques of new institutionalism. For instance, we may point to concerns that
particular applications are relatively selective in their explanatory rigour (Barzelay and
Gallego 2006). There have been questions as to the general validity of institutionalist
explanations for understanding and exploring institutional and organizational change
(Gorges 2000). Moreover, distinctions exist between the various schools of thought
which comprise the broad institutionalist umbrella (Hall and Taylor 1996). Thus, whilst
the promotion of interdisciplinary thinking through disciplinary boundary crossing may
be considered to be fruitful, following Thelen (1999), this has tended to result in ‘intellec-
tual sprawl’. Thus AQ3, for example, Pierre (1999, 373) observed that whilst ‘institutional
theory has become a leitmotiv in much of mainstream political science, the institutional
dimension of urban politics remains unclear and ambiguous’. This ambiguity and a per-
ceived relative lack of clarity simultaneously open up important theoretical and empirical
research agendas and demand clearer explanation.
Cognizant of these caveats, what remains of interest is that an institutional analysis
offers the potential to unpick the dynamics and narratives in changing state–market
relations. In particular, new institutionalism focuses on the nature of the social relations
and motivations which prompt state (public) and market (private) actions. It allows for
an appreciation of how different institutional arrangements can affect the behaviours of
individuals (Webster 2007). This relational dimension itself reflects the balance of
power in the underlying bundle of property rights, the transaction costs involved and
the reconciliation of different interests. Reconfiguring and understanding these relations
are of direct significance to the mobilization of collective action and the design of appro-
priate social institutions where competing individual interests prevail. More precisely, we
follow the line of argument put forward in the new institutionalism which focuses on the
importance of transaction costs in social and economic behaviours (Hall and Taylor 1991)
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and related theoretical discussions within statutory land use planning (see, for example,
Alexander 2001a; Webster 2005b; Buitelaar and Needham 2007). This paper contributes
a marine dimension to this emerging knowledge base.
Transaction Costs: a Moving Equilibrium
Transaction costs represent the dynamics realities of complex market transactions, and
may be extended to understanding the nature of state–market relations, and further
state–market–civil arrangements (Alexander 2001a). Transaction costs comprise those
costs involved in facilitating and negotiating economic and social actions associated
with market production, consumption and exchange. Transaction costs may be distin-
guished from the normal costs of production and refer to those costs associated with the
facilitating of economic relations, contracts and compliance. The concept was initially
identified in relation to the legal, financial and contractual costs incurred as private
firms engaged in their various activities. Early thinking had assumed that such costs
either did not exist or did not have any effect on private sector decision-making.
Dawkins (2000, 507), for example, summarized the initial understanding of transaction
costs as set out in the original reasoning of Coase (1937):
According to Coase, in a world of zero transaction costs, public policy intervention
is not only unwarranted, it is irrelevant from the standpoint of economic efficiency.
Private decision makers will resolve market failures through voluntary agreements.
Only when positive transaction costs are considered do interventionist policies
become one of the many nonmarket mechanisms that may be required to create a
pareto optimal economic outcome, defined as any economic outcome that benefits
at least one person without harming someone else.
The original theoretical exposition of zero transaction costs was located in market to
market contexts. It was recognized, however, that the assumption of the absence of
costs involved in market transactions was untenable. Indeed, Coase (1960) pointed to
the existence of positive transaction costs and the complex nature of the types of tasks
required to prosecute a market transaction as follows:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake
the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed,
and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate
to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the
pricing system worked without cost (Coase 1960, 7).
Building on his work relating to the theory of the firm, Coase (1937, 14) advanced a
‘theory of equilibrium’ to explain how those involved in any market exchange constantly
experiment with the institutional arrangements for organizing or controlling the range of
transactions involved. These ideas were initially formulated in the context of market to
market relations and asserted a model of economic exchange based on hierarchical auth-
ority as a means of economizing on transaction costs. The argument was that firms behave
Aquaculture Development in Scotland 5
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so as to minimize transaction costs. Significantly, Coase (1937) pointed to ‘a theory of
moving equilibrium’ in which contractual relations are transacted and are likely to
change over time. In other words, institutional structures and relations are reworked and
adapt to the evolutionary organizational contexts in which they are embedded in order
to remain efficient. This process of readjustment involves considering notions of coopera-
tive market behaviour so as to reduce the costs of exchange, compliance and enforcement.
In effect, the various interests involved in market to market exchanges must subscribe to,
or align themselves with, the prevailing institutional objectives. Where institutional
arrangements are perceived as inefficient, it follows that there will be pressure for
reform to secure efficiency gains and reduce—or remove—the transaction costs involved.
The underlying argument then was that behaviours would change as firms sought to
minimize or avoid the transaction costs which were incurred in closing a specific
exchange between private interests. Following Alexander (2001a), there is a helpful dis-
tinction between behaviours of discriminating alignment of transaction costs and insti-
tutional design to fit the transaction costs. The latter involves the designing of rules
and processes to enable behaviour to comply with wider societal values (Alexander
2005). This reasoning provides an insight into the behaviours which might be expected
in state–market transactions and relations since they may be associated with the recon-
ciliation of private and public interests. In seeking to reduce or mitigate externalities, for
example, the state through its interventions can generate new or additional transaction
costs for private firms. In effect, securing greater compliance by firms to minimize the
socio-environmental impacts of those costs of their activities involves additional (trans-
action) costs on those businesses. Moreover, in devising appropriate or institutional regu-
lations, the state itself incurs transaction costs, such as those linked to the planning,
monitoring and enforcement of its standards. Following the logic of the moving equili-
brium idea, it is in the interest of state and markets to explore the minimization of those
costs. Alexander (2001b) posits that the appropriate institutional design will seek to
secure new transaction cost reduction. This suggests the case for deliberate reconciliation
of public and private interests.
Transaction costs are thus an important variable in understanding the evolution of the
institutional framework for the management of the marine resource. Firstly, in the
context of state–market relations, the momentum for any redesign of institutional and
interventionist arrangement is influenced by the countervailing institutional, subinstitu-
tional and market relations in which individuals and organizations behave, operate and
interact. Secondly, the redesign of those institutional arrangements will be determined
by the nature of the transaction costs involved. More specifically, it will be informed by
the ways in which the efficiency problem (understood here as managing any social
cost) is socially constructed. Thirdly, for the new institutional arrangements to become
embedded in the established economic system, the parties involved must be open to the
dynamism of institutional relations and take account of the experimentation and associated
learning with respect to securing an appropriate equilibrium. This is to ensure that there is
institutional and political legitimacy for the regulatory framework imposed. These narra-
tives are now used to discuss the evolution of aquaculture planning and regulation in Scot-
land and to consider why government controls have been deemed to be the appropriate
mode of intervention in the management and governance of aquaculture, as opposed to
relying solely on private and voluntary arrangements.
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Aquaculture Development in Scotland
The Commission of European Communities (2002, 3) defines aquaculture as the ‘rearing
or culture of aquatic organisms using techniques designed to increase the production of the
organisms in question beyond the natural capacity of the environment’. Highly diverse, in
practice, the industry comprises marine fish-farming, marine mollusc-farming, freshwater
fish-farming and aquatic plants. These activities concern a spectrum of water-based
localities and, importantly, impact on the coastal zone as well as the wider marine
resource. Aquaculture development has implications for different elements of the
marine–coastal–terrestrial environments. These may be reduced to the use of the sea-
bed for anchoring sea-cages, for example; the associated landward development to
support facilities, such as those concerned with storage and distribution, and access
requirements; and the sea-water in which the organisms are farmed. In global terms, aqua-
culture has expanded considerably during the last 60 years with respect to production,
investment and employment (Food and Agriculture Organization 2010). The efficient,
effective and equitable management and governance of the impacts of aquaculture are
thus of global importance.
The aquaculture industry involves a composite of environmental considerations (Read
and Fernandes 2003); legal aspects (Glenn and White 2007) and marine spatial dimensions
(Rennie 2010). Whilst controlled aquaculture has been heralded by some as a positive
development, paradoxically, certain types of aquaculture production are identified as
representing a further source of risk to wild stocks (Naylor et al. 2000). Although pro-
ductivity has increased, the associated growth and accompanying concentration of the
aquaculture industry raise important questions in relation to the sector’s environmental
and ecological impacts (Fernandes, Miller, and Read 2000; Whitmarsh and Wattage
2006). Moreover, the heterogeneity of marine users and the differentiated (and often com-
peting) rights over the marine resource have drawn attention to the need to design an
appropriate institutional framework capable of dealing with the marine environment’s
inherent dynamism and complexity; to manage externalities and to mediate between com-
peting interests.
Aquaculture involves potential for economic disbenefits and social and environmental
costs. This makes the governance of the sector of paramount importance (Food and Agri-
culture Organization 2010). This agenda in itself is of comparative international interest,
given the advocacy of exploring alternative governance modes, including voluntary con-
tracting, co-management and self-regulation of aquaculture development (Commission of
the European Communities 2002). In practice, however, governance including the licen-
sing, regulation and monitoring of the aquaculture industry is highly fragmented. In
different contexts, planning and regulation have tended to evolve incrementally over
time in response to new waves of scientific evidence, changing perceptions of risks and
more vocal public concern (Henderson and Davies 2000). As a consequence, Howarth
(2006, 14) pointed to ‘the rather embryonic state of legal regimes for aquaculture,
where tensions between public and private rights have not been satisfactorily resolved’.
The AQ4significance of what may be described as a weak governance regime with respect
to aquaculture has to be understood, in part, as a consequence of the pace and scale of
technological innovation which has been developed in order to exploit the marine
environment. Indeed, Howarth (2006, 15) described these developments as ‘nothing
short of miraculous’.
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Previous research (Peel and Lloyd 2008) explained how new regulatory controls over
aquaculture in Scotland evolved over three broad phases. Firstly, the development of
the aquaculture industry was managed and advanced by private ownership and operating
interests through the Crown Estate. This self-regulation phase took place within a particu-
lar understanding of the wider social context to the industry in Scotland. Significantly, the
specific environmental, hydrological and ecological requirements of the industry concen-
trated its development principally on the West Coast of Scotland and the Shetland Islands
(Coull 1996) in relatively remote rural communities. As such, the sector was deemed to
have significant socio-economic benefits for these localities (Highlands and Islands Enter-
prise 1999). The rapid growth, intensity and geographical concentration of the sector,
however, precipitated an awareness of the wider environmental costs and drew attention
to, for example, the impact of fish escapes on wild populations, the effects of pesticides
on natural water environments, health and safety considerations and inter-farm spillover
effects (Cobham Resource Consultants 1987). This mobilized efforts to redesign the insti-
tutional relations to address the various impacts and social costs involved. This iterative
and incremental process of institutional redesign serves to explain its partial and incom-
plete form. It serves to illustrate that momentum for any redesign of institutional arrange-
ments is influenced by the countervailing institutional and subinstitutional relations in
which individuals and organizations in the aquaculture sector behave, operate and interact.
Awareness of these individual issues prompted a concern with how best to manage
specific social costs. This involved active deliberations around the transaction costs
incurred by both the Crown Estate and individual fish-farms and the need to devise
more efficient institutional arrangements to accommodate the plurality of interests con-
cerned. These debates accentuated the (then) dual role of the Crown Estate as land
owner and de facto regulator of the aquaculture industry (Lloyd and Livingstone
1991a). In short, early management of the industry was characterized by a private property
regime and self-regulation as the institutional device. This was socially constructed as the
most efficient way of dealing with the transaction costs involved in those particular cir-
cumstances. Yet, the individual problems resulted in sectorally devised policy responses
(Edwards 2003). Moreover, and in addition, environmental groups, local planning auth-
orities and other marine users, as well as the general public, became increasingly aware
of the divergence between the social and private interests involved (Lloyd and Livingstone
1991b). Following Hannigan (2006), wider public debate and assertion of environmental
claims highlighted the policy tensions.
Societal expectations of environmental values in the marine context were changing
(Berry and Davison 2001), leading to pressure to redesign and rebalance the institutional
framework in the light of greater diversification in the local economy. Importantly, then,
institutional relations became more complex as knowledge and understanding of the
impacts of the industry became more widespread and new interests in protecting and
using the marine resource began to compete for attention. Critically, efficiency concerns
were juxtaposed against arguments for greater democratic accountability. A perceived
development–environment imbalance posed specific questions for the nature of the insti-
tutional design to manage this new set of transaction costs. The redesign of the institutional
arrangements was determined not only by the nature of the transaction costs involved but
also by the ways in which the efficiency problems (externalities) were socially con-
structed. This second phase was characterized by the questioning of the efficacy of self-
regulation as an institutional device and the gradual accretion of state regulatory powers.
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Underpinning the moving equilibrium idea is the argument that those involved in
managing transaction costs actively experiment in the design of appropriate insti-
tutional arrangements and a perennial search to recalibrate them accordingly. In the
context of aquaculture, not only is the natural environment dynamic, and the social
construction of community and economic well-being iterative, but the institutional
arrangements were also of necessity evolving in order to secure a more efficient gov-
ernance framework. The second phase of aquaculture management involved stronger
state strategic locational guidance and interim land use planning arrangements.
These sought to better integrate the planning considerations relating to the siting
and design issues of aquaculture-related development (Scottish Executive 2003). The
transfer from private to state responsibility was a way in which aquaculture interests
could lessen their transaction costs whilst the state could better secure a public interest
over the industry.
A third phase involved full land use planning regulation being put into place by the
Planning etc. Scotland Act 2006. This represented the maturation of thinking around
managing the transaction costs to both market and public interests. The steps
towards a relatively more hierarchical institutional arrangement reflected an incremen-
tal learning process around the nature of the problem, the extent of the transaction
costs and the required institutional form. Moreover, in procedural terms, it is important
to note that the introduction of the new planning legislation, and the accompanying
policy guidance (Scottish Executive 2007), was underpinned by processes of evidence
gathering, consultation and multi-stakeholder dialogue. This relational and norm-build-
ing aspect may be seen as critical components of embedding the new institutional
arrangements amongst the subinstitutional actors. This deliberative dimension may
be understood as an important aspect of securing stakeholder buy-in to the new insti-
tutional arrangements and has also turned on seeking to enhance both technocratic and
democratic dimensions since it addresses both the efficiency and inclusivity of the
planning system.
The addition of planning controls over marine aquaculture is important for a number
of reasons. It is innovative in that, for the first time, it takes a strategic and integrative
approach to managing the coastal zone and waters out to the 12-nautical mile limit.
As a particular form of state intervention, the (established) planning system involves
forward planning, development management and enforcement. These elements inevitably
bring with them a new set of transaction costs. The efficient management of these con-
stituent parts forms an important challenge for articulating the public interest since inter-
vention and non-intervention both incur costs. Critically — and this was an integral part
of the logic underpinning the introduction of planning controls — planning involves
opportunities for public engagement. This aspect may yet create a new layer of trans-
action costs to be taken into consideration. Moreover, the aquaculture sector itself is
changing since it has engaged in a programme of merger and consolidation, resulting
in an overall reduction of the number of registered companies (Marsden 2012). In
addition, the wider debates about marine (spatial) planning suggest the potential for rela-
tively more strategic management of the marine resource. This itself reflects the broad-
ening of the social construction of the marine and coastal environments (Peel and Lloyd
2004) and raises questions for how sectoral micro-policy designs are integrated into the
macro-institutional design.
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A Moving Equilibrium
Evidence suggests that a fourth phase may be identified which further redefines state–
market relations in the aquaculture sector. This phase points to ongoing experimentation
to determine the appropriate balance of the transaction costs involved in planning and
managing market and public interests. Moreover, the extension of local authority planning
controls to marine aquaculture is only part of a bigger governance arena and progress
towards marine planning. Efforts to refine the planning regime demonstrate, in effect, a
moving equilibrium. The introduction of the Scotland etc. Planning Act (2006) was part
of a root-and-branch modernization and reform of the statutory land use planning
system (Peel and Lloyd 2006). Implementation has involved substantial critical reflection
and efforts to embed a cultural change in developmental relations in Scotland (Lloyd and
Peel 2011). This reflexive phase has witnessed sustained efforts to secure the efficiency,
equity and effectiveness of the planning regime (Lloyd and Peel 2012). In practical
terms the ongoing refinement of the relationships involved in minimizing transaction
costs is evident in a number of stages of thinking.
In May 2009, the Scottish Government set out its renewed strategic framework for aqua-
culture. This asserted the need for continuing improvement of the sector whilst ensuring
the growth and development of the industry (Scottish Government 2009). It was based
on an inclusive consultative and collaborative process and engagement with key stake-
holders. In further refining its relationship with the industry, the Scottish Government
(2010) stated its intentions for how the planning system would support the continued
development of aquaculture:
the Government sees a reformed planning system as essential to promoting sustain-
able economic growth in Scotland. Important changes have been made to the plan-
ning system and recent proposals to amend its fee structure continue the
Government’s aim of making it fairer and easier to set up or expand a business.
However, that is still not enough. The Government, its agencies, local authorities
and the fish farming industry have all been working to streamline the planning
process for aquaculture developments (Scottish Government 2010, 1 emphasis
added).
This strategic ambition forms part of the Scottish Government’s objective of removing
unnecessary barriers to sustainable economic growth. In other words, the political ambi-
tion is to minimize the transaction costs not only on the aquaculture industry but also
on the government itself. Subsequent research (Scottish Aquaculture Research Forum
2010) explored the possibility of introducing permitted development rights to aquaculture.
This initiative was seen as a way of providing greater flexibility for fish-farmers in chan-
ging from finfish to shellfish and from salmon to halibut. The research essentially con-
cerned those developments and changes of use which are generally non-contentious in
nature — reflecting practice in terrestrial land use planning. A subsequent paper (Scottish
Government 2011) further clarified the roles and responsibilities of the interests involved
in aquaculture. This sought to ensure the minimization of transaction costs for the sector in
complying with the expected behaviour by government. Reflecting a holistic governance
approach and broader sustainability principles (Food and Agriculture Organization 2010),
attention was drawn to economic goals, water quality, coastal landscapes, recreation and
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tourism, wild fish stocks and environmental impacts. In effect compliance with these cri-
teria in a responsible way would allow the industry to minimize any transaction costs
involved. Finally, a draft circular (Scottish Government 2013) articulates the broader stra-
tegic context for aquaculture by linking the marine and terrestrial planning systems.
Attempts AQ5to establish greater integration devise a more comprehensive marine governance
framework that is illustrative of a commitment to join up thinking across all the dimen-
sions of the marine — planning, licensing, conservation and enforcement. This experimen-
tation in coordinating and streamlining governance seeks to minimize potential transaction
costs for all interests involved.
This evolutionary and reflexive approach to regulatory design indicates that for new
institutional arrangements to become embedded in the established economic system, the
parties involved must be open to the dynamism of institutional relations and take
account of the experimentation and associated learning with respect to retaining and nur-
turing an appropriate moving equilibrium. The nature and associated processes of this
moving institutional framework also provide institutional legitimacy for the technocratic
costs imposed on the market and the public interests and benefits derived from opportu-
nities for democratic engagement.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to contribute to an understanding of the nature of the relations and
interactions of marine actors through a case study of the regulation of aquaculture in Scot-
land. Whilst the details are case specific, we have sought to identify issues of more general
relevance and from which it is possible to infer aspects of institutional design for marine
planning. Importantly, these insights turn on the need to obtain multi-actor buy-in to any
new marine governance regime if the anticipated efficiency, equity and effectiveness gains
are to be secured. A new institutionalist approach offers a nuanced heterodox insight into
the recalibration of institutional arrangements for aquaculture in Scotland. Specifically,
the paper has argued that transaction costs are an important variable in understanding
the evolution of the institutional framework for the management of aquaculture and illus-
trate the necessary dynamics of laws, regulations and standards. The (re-)framing of the
transaction costs involved in aquaculture has clearly been different over time as those
involved sought to establish an appropriate equilibrium in institutional relations from
self-regulation to state control of development rights. This involved both discriminating
alignment and institutional design considerations.
The movement from self- to state regulation took account of emerging scientific evi-
dence and reflected broader societal, ecological and governmental agendas (Gubbay
1995). These concerns were, in part, disseminated by environmental campaign groups
(Scottish Environment Link 2002). Notably, this evolving process has involved consider-
ation, for instance, of how best to design institutional relations that facilitate a diversifica-
tion of the local economy (Scottish Natural Heritage 2002). The extension of land use
planning controls in the legislation to include the coastal and transitional waters was a
step-change in conventional statutory land use planning since this means that finfish and
shellfish farming are subject to statutory (land-based) planning controls. In effect, the
regulatory powers fall on the established local terrestrial planning authorities to manage
and enforce. This represents much more than a narrow construction of state intervention
to redress the existence of market externalities since it forms part of a much wider
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project to reform and modernize the planning system and to enhance its efficiency and
democratic accountability through the creation of a (relatively) more consistent planning
and development framework (Peel and Lloyd 2007). Statutory controls are an explicit
acknowledgement of the increasing importance of devising an appropriate regulation of
the marine resource and of recognizing the inter-connectedness of land and sea at the
coastal interface. The later phases demonstrate the importance of research and critical
reflection as regulation becomes more sophisticated, behaviours are modified and per-
ceived norms become consolidated in practice.
Reworking Coase’s (1960) argument of a policy or regulatory time-lag in relation to the
management of the (marine) commons, the costs of introducing planning controls is
deemed necessary relative to the costs of not doing so — or allowing the social costs
and market inefficiencies to prevail. This hybrid approach is consistent with theoretical
and empirical developments in fisheries which challenge the assumption of a polarized
politics where state and market regimes are diametrically opposed (Feeny, Hanna, and
McEvoy 1996). The expectations informing the introduction of state planning controls
are that this iteration of marine governance is intended to reduce the costs of transactions
in these contested relations, including in policy-making, monitoring or enforcement. It is
to be anticipated that any such system will be sufficiently flexible to accommodate unfore-
seen circumstances and involve negotiating a moving equilibrium.
This case study of regulating the aquaculture sector offers potential insights for the plan-
ning and management of the marine resource as a whole. In the UK, the tentative advance
of a legal framework to control and manage the marine environment (Slater 2007; Scottish
Government 2013) could be served by the application of a transaction costs analysis.
Debates, to date, have tended to highlight the complexity and dynamism of the marine
environment, the contested interests of users and the relative paucity of information in
certain quarters. Any proposed matrix of intervention would need to be sensitive to
these specific operational, jurisdictional and organizational constraints. How the individ-
ual motivations and interactions of the various users are further refined over time will, in
part, also be informed by the particular modes of exchange, the nature of the transaction
costs involved, the extent to which different values are acknowledged and how efficient
the institutional design is perceived to be in securing an acceptable equilibrium in practice.
In short, the behaviour of the regulatory authorities and the arrangements to support pro-
cesses of collective learning must shape the tone of any new institutional context for the
marine.
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